My research interests are at the intersection between finance and macroeconomics, with a focus on topcis in financial intermediation, corporate finance, and monetary economics.
My work can be broadly categorized into two areas. My first research agenda focuses on questions in financial intermediation and regulation. My second research agenda is centered around the rise of intangible capital, and its implications for corporate finance, investment, and the wider macro-economy.
Dynamic macro-banking model. Banks have market power over depositors but cannot set negative deposit rates. Paper shows that the ZLB can make capital regulation less effective in curbing risk taking, delivers a novel rationale for cyclically adjusting capital requirements, and analyzes interactions of capital regulation with unconventional monetary policy.
Compared to physical investment (CAPX), intangible investment reacts less to monetary policy. This holds both in high-frequency stock price reactions, as well as firm-level and aggregate investment response in instrumental variable local projections. Results are consistent with intangible capital muting the credit channel and user cost channel of monetary policy.
Corporate finance theory built around the insight that the creation of intangible capital largely relies on high-skill human capital. Delivers novel rationale for weak investment- and funding demand of high-intangible firms, distinct from traditional precautionary motive.
Paper creates country-level measure of bank liquidity creation for large set of countries. Bank liquidity creation increases growth, in particular by boosting tangible investment in industries that rely more on debt financing.
General equilibrium growth model to understand whether recent long-term trends such as falling interest rates and low demand for external finance by corporations may be related to the rising importance of intangible and human capital.
Empirical paper, testing predictions from "Creating Intangible Capital" using firm-level data. High-intangible firms have lower leverage, more cash, pay more deferred stock compensation, and make payouts via repurchases rather than dividends. Patterns hold among firms that are unlikely to be financially constrained.
We analyze private fixed investment across European economies and in the US over the past 20 years, focusing on tangible and intangible investment and the role of competition and financial constraints. In both regions, we find that investment is weak, but we argue that the reasons are more cyclical in Europe and more structural in the US. In the US, we find that investment is lower than predicted by fundamentals starting around 2000, and that the gap is driven by industries where competition has decreased over time. The decline in US investment has coincided with increased concentration and decreased anti-trust enforcement. In Europe, on the other hand, investment is roughly in line with measures of profitability and Tobin’s Q for the majority countries, except at the peak of the crisis, most notably Spain and Italy. Unlike in the US, concentration has been stable or even declining in Europe, while product market regulation have decreased and anti-trust regulation has increased. Regarding intangible investment, we find that it accounts for some but not all of the weakness in measured investment. We also find that EU firms have been catching up with their US counterparts in intangible capital. The process of intangible deepening happens mostly within firms in Europe, as opposed to between firms in the US.